P2P-Banking.com

The State of Montana signed an agreement with Prosper Marketplace Inc. to resolve matters relating to unregistered securities and securities fraud. (more…)

P2P lending holds great promise: more transparency, purposeful direction of investments and economic advantages for borrowers and lenders. Some even talk of democratization of financial processes.

But are advantages and risks evenly balanced between borrowers and lenders?

For the borrower p2p lending fulfills most promises and the only risk is that the desired loan goes unfunded. Most services have a simple fee structure with no hidden fees and the borrower only pays fees when he does receive the wanted loan. And within a time frame of a few weeks after sign-up the borrower reaches his goal - once his loan is funded and the money is transferred to his account. Platforms with auction mechanisms can even benefit the borrower further in supplying the loan at a lower interest rate then the maximum he set.

The lender on the other side is promised an attractive return on investment but faces multiple risks:

• borrower fails to repay the loan
• (identity) fraud
• p2p lending company fails and ceases to service loans (e.g. Boober Netherlands)
• unreliable forecasts of ROI and default rates
• on some services: open/undefined tax and legal issues
• on some microfinance services: currency exchange risks
• on some microfinance services: risk of MFI failure

There is also an information asymmetry. The borrower usually has most of the information he needs in advance and the information he has is accurate. Should the information be not accurate (e.g. wrong information on at what interest rates he can be funded) then he can retry at no additional costs only incurring a delay. The lender has information, which is partly based on estimates or forecasts that might prove unreliable and other parts of the information might be untrue (e.g. borrower reported income or borrower description of purpose of the loan). For privacy reasons it might also be a subset of the information the p2p lending service itself has on the borrower (e.g. town of residence omitted, or income or jobs listed only in categories instead of values).

The lending experience of the lender is further hindered by the timeline. The problems may impact him at any point in time of a several year loan term. And he either has no way to terminate his investment immediately or if there is a secondary market he might be only able to do so by accepting economic disadvantages in return for the option to selling off.

The situation of the lenders in this comparison to the borrowers is worsened by the alignment of interests of the p2p lending service company with the borrowers. This is due to several factors:

• in most models borrowers pay the larger part of the fees and are thereby important for the revenues
• in some markets attracting borrowers is the limiting factor for growth
• for obvious image and marketing reasons the p2p lending company is not eager to share information on fraud and (in some cases) default details
• for the same reasons companies are slow to react and change their lender information when real default levels are much higher then fore-casted (or even advertised) default levels (examples are Prosper, MYC4)

This imparity results in different levels of satisfaction with the p2p lending service for lenders and borrowers. While those p2p lending services that offer (unmoderated) discussion forums have only few unsatisfied borrowers voicing their opinion (and then mostly on technical issues) lender concern and critic rises over time on some of these services (to the extend that Prosper even deleted it’s forum at one point in time).

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In the recently published study “Emergence of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic Markets: The Case of Online P2P Lending“, Sven Berger and Fabian Gleisner examined more then 14,000 Prosper loans (originated from Nov. 2005 to Sep. 2007) to evaluate the benefits borrowers derived from joining a Prosper group versus listings with no group affiliation.

They tested the following hypothesises for statistical evidence:

• Borrowers within groups are able to borrow at lower credit spreads.
• The recommendation of a credit listing by the group leader leads to lower credit spreads.
• A group leader’s bidding serves as a credible signal for the quality of the credit listing and results in lower credit spreads.
• A group leader’s bidding on a credit listing signals information quality and has a stronger impact on credit spreads than a recommendation by the group leader.
• A higher group rating leads to lower credit spreads.
• Increasing group size leads to lower credit spreads.

They found that the group leader as intermediary played a very important role on the ability of the borrower to obtain a loan and to obtain this loan at a lower then average interest rate.

Since most of the bids on group affiliated loans came from lenders that were not members of the group, the authors conclude that the group leader has an important signaling function.

Some of the empirical results:

1. The results … confirm our fundamental hypothesis H1: the use of an interme- diary in the electronic marketplace significantly lowers borrowers’ loan spread. Group affiliation ceteris paribus lowers the credit spread by 25 basis points. (page 15)
2. Does the choice of the intermediary matter? Should borrowers make demands on paid intermediary services? In order to be able to compare the net impact of unpaid and paid groups, we analyze Bor- rower Rate Net … and find that intermediation significantly lowers borrower’s cost of credit overall. However, we document a dif- ference in the net impact of group membership of 42 basis points: An unpaid intermediary reduces borrower’s credit spread by 107 basis points, a paid intermediary by 65 basis points. It follows that the group fee can turn the case for a paid intermedi- ary borderline. The average group fee of 110 basis points … will more than counter the net reduction in credit spread. Taken together, inter- mediation has a positive net impact but the choice of intermediary matters. We hereby do not com- ment on the overall impact of paid groups, since this analysis does not incorporate the intermediary’s role in overall access to credit or the long-run performance of the loan thus originated. (page 15ff)
3. the group leader’s bid for the borrower’s credit listing exerts a significant stronger impact on borrowers’ credit conditions than a recommendation. Moreover, Certification is only significant at the 10-percent level. We can confirm Hypothesis H3b: the regression coefficient of Group Leader Bid exceeds Certification. (page 18)

The study delivers strong evidence that Prosper borrowers benefited financially from joining Prosper groups.

Read the study now in BuR - Business Research.

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Prosper.com has restarted offering p2p lending to customers after an SEC imposed 6 months stop (quiet period).

Prosper chief executive Chris Larsen said the California Department of Corporations has authorized the company to resume raising money in California and then lending it out under a system that lets borrowers and lenders use bids to set the interest rates on loans. “I hope this leads to wider acceptance of peer-to-peer lending,” said Commissioner of Corporations Preston DuFauchard. He said the state’s experience with Prosper, prior to the SEC intervention, made it “comfortable” that its bidding system gives lenders the information they need to invest in loans wisely.

Prosper hopes to reopen for lenders from other states but it remains uncertain when Prosper will be allowed to do so.

Prosper raises the minimum credit score required to 640 (Grade C under the old rating). This applies only to new borrowers. Borrowers registered before the quiet period that have lower credit grades can still apply for second loans (example: loan listing of a HR borrower).

Besides “direct” p2p loan listings, Prosper offers “Open Market Listings“, which are described as following:

Open Market loans are existing loans that were underwritten by financial institutions that are credit experts in areas such as auto loans, small business loans or social impact loans. The loan seller describes the loan in an Open Market listing, and then sells and assigns the loan to Prosper.

Open Market loans may include existing consumer loans or retail installment sale contracts. They can be secured or unsecured loans, and may include small business loans, where the borrower is a business entity, not an individual.

Open Market listings describe the existing Open Market loan, owned by the loan seller, which is offered for sale on the Prosper marketplace. Each listing displays information to assist the lender in making an informed bidding decision. Lenders can review the sale price for the Open Market loan, the yield percentage that corresponds to the sales price, the remaining principal balance of the loan and the interest rate the borrower is obligated to pay on the loan.

In some instances on auto loans, you can even see the factory where the car was built. This is all part of the transparency Prosper brings to the marketplace so that you can make informed decisions on how to invest your money.

Prosper plans a secondary market which in future will allow lenders to trade notes.

(Sources: Prosper, San Francisco Chronicle)

The site Prosper.com shows only a maintenance note today saying “… We expect the site to be down both Saturday (4/25/2009) and Sunday (4/26/2009).”.

Speculation: Maybe Prosper will end its quiet period and resume its full p2p lending service on Monday?

Prosper.com, which is still in quiet period and not allowing new loans, made a new SEC filing yesterday. In this third amendment to the S-1 filing makes several amendments, most notably introducing securitization for initial offerings of loans.

Prosper plans “Open market loans”, which apparently are loans issued by traditional lenders which being securitized and resold to Prosper lenders. I am somewhat sceptical how many Prosper lenders will like the “open market loans” offer. To me this seems a far excursion from the peer to peer lending idea.

In the filing Prosper states that FolioFn will be the operator of the Prosper secondary market (named “Folio Investing Note Trader Platform”). FolioFn already operates the Note Trading Platform of Lending Club.

More changes in the new filing are in a review in this blog post at P2PLendingNews.

P2P lending is spreading internationally. While the biggest loan volumes are generated in the US market, many p2p lending websites have been established in other international markets.

P2P-Banking.com has created the following overview table listing services that are in operation and ranked them by loan volume. The loan volumes are not directly comparable for they are cumulative since launch of each service and represent different time spans.

In total approx. 740 million US$ have been funded through peer to peer lending/social lending services so far worldwide.

This image may be reprinted on other internet sites, provided it is not altered or resized and the following text (including the direct link to this article) is given as source directly below the image:
Source: P2P-Banking.com

Since the previous version of this table especially Zopa (UK), Lending Club and Kiva thrived. With Prosper, Loanio and Fynanz halted, Lending Club profits from the situation.

This image may be reprinted under the same conditions as the first one.

Prosper.com yesterday announced it’s new registration filing.

The SEC filing follows an earlier one from last year that apparently did not succeed. Some speculation on the reasons Prosper’s first filing was ill-fated are on Fred93’s blog.

According to the filing, the class action lawsuit against Prosper reported previously on this blog, is currently the only class action lawsuit by lenders stated in the filing.

The sections on ‘Government regulation’ (page 73) and ‘Risks Relating to Compliance and Regulation’ (page 32) state numerous other legal risks the Prosper business model might face in the future.

For the year 2007 the filing reports that Prosper marketplace incurred a net loss of 11.8 million US$ - but still had more than 20 million US$ in cash or cash equivalents on Dec. 31st, 2007.

The following quote shows that in many attempted listings Prosper was not able to verify the income of the borrowers:

For example between September 1, 2007 and August 31, 2008, we verified employment and income for only approximately 22.6% of borrowers. …

Of the borrowers undergoing income verification for the period from September 1, 2007 to August 31, 2008:

+ approximately 56.7% provided us with satisfactory responses and received a borrower loan;
+ approximately 37.7% did not provide satisfactory responses, or did not respond, and their listings were cancelled; and
+ approximately 5.9% either withdrew their listings, or failed to receive bids totaling the amount of their requested loan.

On a side note: The document also discloses that Prosper bought the Prosper.com domain in 2006 for a price of 603,659 US$ (page F-14), of which 320,000 was payed in cash.

The SEC cease and desist order against Prosper offered the legal arguments on a plate, now the first class action lawsuit filed against Prosper Marketplace Inc. uses the SEC filing as exhibit A to state it’s case. Regarding numbers and affected lenders the lawsuit by The Rosen Law Firm, New York, states

“…As of October, 2008 approx. $21.7 million of loan notes purchased by Class Action members have become worthless because the borrowers did not pay the loans to Prosper. Additional loan notes will become worthless as more loans are charged off as uncollectible.
…
there are tens of thousands, and perhaps hundreds of thousands of, loan note purchasers that are class action members…”

Prosper is required to file a written response within 30 days. The first court date is set for May 1st, 2009.

On the same issue - selling unregistered securities - but in an otherwise unrelated case Prosper agreed to pay a 1 million US$ fine in a settlement to the states to avoid individual states suing against Prosper. More information on that in the press release of the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA).
This is somewhat surprising to me as Prosper did obtain licenses in over 25 states and conducted lending under those, before it switched to the model using the WebBank. (see ‘Prosper riding the state-by-state roller coaster‘ and ‘Prosper goes national with 36 percent max interest rate‘). The same states that granted the licenses now wanting to sue Prosper?

Last week Zopa’s CEO Giles Andrews commented that regulation issue were the reason why Zopa did not use it’s UK model when it entered the US market.

While Lending Club has completed SEC registration and therefore is in compliance with the rules of the SEC, it might still face some risks. An article of the Oregonian on the NASAA settlement states:

“Oregon regulators also are investigating 40billion.com, owned by Atlanta-based 3 Guys in a Garage, and is currently reviewing a registration request by Sunnyvale, Calif.-based Lending Club, Anselm said.”

In a SEC filing of yesterday, the SEC has ordered Prosper to cease and desist. On page two it states that

The loan notes issued by Prosper pursuant to this platform are securities and Prosper, from approximately January 2006 through October 14, 2008, violated Sections 5(a) and (c) of the Securities Act, which prohibit the offer or sale of securities without an effective registration statement or a valid exemption from registration.

From page six:

In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate to impose the sanctions agreed to in Respondent Prosper’s Offer.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:
Pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act, Respondent Prosper cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Sections 5(a) and (c) of the Securities Act.

So far Prosper has not commented on the situation.